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npoq Tov eiTiovxa—Sources and Credibility of
De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 8
JOHN GLUCKER
How does one ascertain that a saying ascribed to Zeno of Citium represents
a genuine philosophical view of the founder of Stoicism? This is no idle
question. By the time of Diogenes Laertius at the latest, most people seem
no longer to have read the works of the early Stoics. Having completed the
biographical section in his Life of Zeno (VII. 1-38), Diogenes proceeds to
offer us, not a summary of Zeno's own philosophy, but a Stoic Koivf|. His
excuse for this (VII. 38)—8ia to xotixov KxtatTiv yeveoGai if\c,
aipeoecoq—is feeble. The Stoics were no Epicureans or Pythagoreans,
claiming to carry on and disseminate the "true doctrines" discovered once for
all by a divine founder: even Diogenes' own doxography enters, from time
to time, into details about disagreements and disputes among the various
Stoics. Plato was also the founder of a "school of thought." This does not
prevent Diogenes from presenting us with a long summary of Plato's own
dpeoKovTa (III. 67-109). When Diogenes' source supplies an account of
various dycoyaC within the same school, he has no hesitation in
reproducing his source's doxography with all the shades of difference (III.
86-97). It is merely that by his time, very few people were likely to have
read the hundreds of scrolls written by Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and
their disciples and followers—or rather, those of them still readily available.
Even by the time of Cicero, the ordinary educated man—even a writer on
philosophical themes like Cicero himself—did not attempt to read the
original works of the early Stoics, but used summaries and doxographies.
What about Plutarch?
It is not my intention here to deal, yet again, with the whole issue of
Plutarch's familiarity with early Stoic sources. Much has been written on
it, from many different angles, often in terms of such generalities and
probabilities as "Plutarch, who read so much ..." or "Plutarch must have
read his Zeno—he quotes him so often" (the examples are my invention, but
they are not pure fiction). I have chosen to concentrate on one piece of
Plutarchean evidence which, I believe, can be treated as a test case. Here,
then, is the text of De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 8:
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Tlpbc, xov eijiovxa
'\ir\8i SiKTiv 8iKdoTi(;, Ttplv a|a.(p(o |iv0ov aKovorii;'
ocvTeX-eyev 6 Zt|V(dv xoio-uTtp tivl Xoyo) xp^nevoq 'en' ajceSei^ev 6
TtpoTEpoi; eiTicov, o\)K aKovoxeov xov 5EDTepo\) X.Eyovxo<; (jt£pa<;
yap exEi x6 ^t|xov)hevov), eix' ouk citieSei^ev (o|xoiov y«P wq ei
HTi5' -OTcriKOVGE kA.ti0£1(; f\ wjcaKotioai; exepexioev). tixoi 5'
a.nibeiE,zv f\ ovk anibzi^tv o\)k ciKo-oaxEov apa xov bevxipov
kiyovioq.' xovxov bk xov Xoyov tpanriaaq ailxoi; dvxEYpctcpE |iev
npbq ir\v TlXa.-c(ovoc, IloA-ixEiav, eX-ve 5e oo(pio|j.axa, koi ttiv
6ia?L£KxiKTiv cbq xomo icoiEiv 5vva|ievTiv ekeXede Jiapa^auPdvEiv
zoxiq |ia0Tixd(;. Kaixoi f\ ditfiSEi^E nX.dxcov ti q-uk drefiSEi^E xd ev
xfi IloA-ixEia, Kax' oidiztpov 5' fiv dvayKaiov dvxiypdcpeiv dXA.d
Jtdvxtoq icEpixxov Ktti ndxaiov. x6 5' awxo xai JtEpi xSv
OCCpiOndxCOV EOXIV ElTtElV.'
A genuine piece of evidence for an "eccentric" Zenonian doctrine? This
is the way in which our passage has been regarded by numerous
distinguished scholars in the last hundred years or so. A. C. Pearson
includes two parts of this chapter, as Fragments 29 (the anecdote) and 6
{eXve—xox>q |j,a0T|X(X(;) of Zeno, in his Fragments ofZeno and Cleanthes?-
On the anecdote, he comments: "The argument is couched in the syllogistic
form which Zeno especially affected: see Introd. p. 33"^—where the
specimens of syllogism he adduces are very different from the disjunctive
argument in our passage. What matters, however, is that Pearson takes this
chapter of Plutarch seriously as a piece of Zenonian doctrine. So does von
Amim, who has the anecdote as SVF I. 78 (Zeno, Rhetorica), the sentence
concerning Plato as I. 259 (Zeno, Ethica), and the sentence on sophisms as
I. 50 (Zeno, Logica). Nicola Festa regards the anecdote as the only
surviving fragment of Zeno's lost work "EXeyxoi 8tjo.'' Alfons Weische
takes it to be an argument against Arcesilaus' practice in utramque partem
dispuiandi} Both are quoted by the late Harold Cherniss in a note to his
edition of the text—true, without comments, but with an obvious
acceptance of our passage as genuine evidence for a Zenonian doctrine.* To
crown it all, we have the clear statement of Professor Daniel Babut in his
great work on Plutarch and the Stoics:
' Text: Pohlenz-Westman. I have omitted the apparatus, since there are no readings relevant
to the argument.
^The Fragments ofZeno and Cleanlhes, with introduction and explanatory notes ... by A.
C. Pearson . . . (London 1891) 80-81; 60-61.
^ Ibid. p. 60.
''Nicola Festa, Iframmenti degli Sloici antichi, vol. I (Bari 1932) 1 15-16.
' Alfons Weische, Cicero unddie neue Akademie (Munster 1961) 77-78.
* Plutarch's Moralia, vol. Xffl, part H, ed. by Harold Chemiss (Loeb Classical Library 1976)
429, note a. See his Introduction, 373-74.
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En revanche, De Stoic, rep. p. 1034 E (7) [misprint for 8-J. G.], de
port^e beaucoup moins gSnerale, et oil Plutarque semble reproduire presque
litt^ralment le raisonnement par lequel Z6non ddmontrait qu'il est inutile
dans un proces—ou en debat philosophique—de preter I'oreille aux deux
parties ou d'dcouter le point de vue de I'adversaire, doit etre consid6r6
comme une veritable citation, bien que Plutarque n'ait pas pris la peine ou
n'ait pas pu indiquer de quel livre elle provenait, et bien qu'U ne pr^tende
pas la reproduire mot a mot7
Doit etre considere comme une veritable citation. After all this, one
finds it surprising that this piece of "Zenonian doctrine" has not yet found
its way into the standard histories of Greek Philosophy or of the Stoa.*
But hold. If the argument in our anecdote were to be regarded as
representing a genuine philosophical position of Zeno, it would land him,
not merely in the contradictions indicated by Plutarch. It would also imply
a wholesale rejection of the task of dialectic as described by Zeno himself in
SVF I. 48^9—both independent of Plutarch. It would also imply that
such Chrysippean fragments as SVF II. 127-29 (all taken from Ch. 10 of
Stoic. Rep.) constitute a complete departure from a doctrine of the founder
of the school and a total rejection of that doctrine.
Let us now consider the form of the anecdote in our chapter. It is a
story about Zeno answering with a counter-argument (dvTeA.e7ev), a
literary quotation. Whether the hexametric line [iTiSe Siktiv SiKdo-jiq kxX.
is Pseudo-PhocyUdes' or Hesiod,^'' it is not very likely that the ancient poet
would have been introduced by Zeno as 6 eiticov, and that Zeno would quote
him simply to contradict him. Zeno is not Socrates of the "aporetic
dialogues." When Zeno wishes to quote poetry—even to alter its order or
its sense—other expressions are used: owExe(; te npoEcpEpETo . . . zohc, . .
.
Ex)pi7ii6o\) oziyip-oc,(jyL VII. 22); lovc, 0* 'HoioSo-o ot{%o-0(; ^ExaypdepEiv
ouTco (ib. 25); (pTjol to ek tfi^ Ni6pri<;(ib. 28). No. It is far more likely
that what we have here is not a quotation from one of Zeno's own works, in
which the ancient hexameter is brought in only to be confuted, but an
anecdote about Zeno. Someone, on some occasion, quoted this line of
poetry against Zeno. Zeno countered him with his disjunctive argument
—
showing, by the way, in the very act of refuting him that he had listened to
the other side: but on this later.
What we have here looks far more like the sort of literary anecdote
called by ancient rhetoricians xpdcu. A number of rhetorical manuals from
' Daniel Babul, Plutarque et le Sloicisme (Paris 1969) 222-23.
'I find no mention of it, for example, in any edition of Zeller, Ueberweg-Praechter, or
Pohlenz.
' Diehl, Anlh. Lyr? 2, p. 98, v. 87—cited in double square brackets. See his apparatus of
testimonia to this line.
"'Fr.338Merkelbach-WesL
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late antiquity deal at some length with xpeia as a rhetorical device.'^ Their
treatment of this sub-literary form is almost entirely the same, with many
sentences and passages repeated virtually word for word (except for the more
lengthy discussion of Theon, which is probably his own extension of what
he had found in his source). The question of their common source
(Hermogenes?) should be investigated elsewhere.'^ For our purpose, it
would be enough to quote at random a definition of xpeia offered by one of
these late rhetoricians:
Xpeia eaxi Xoyoc, fi Ttpa^i; evaxoxoq koV ovvto^o^, t'iq xi
jtpoacoicov dopion-cvov e'xoDoa xtjv ava<popdv, Jtpoi; eitavopGwciv
xivo(; xcov Ev xo) Pico jtapaXa|xPavonevTi."
It may also be of some use for our passage of Plutarch to note that one
of these rhetoricians realized that not each and every xpeia has to be serious
and to contain a moral: eoxi bk xapiev-ci^eoBai ttiv xpeiav evtoxe
\n\5kv E%ovoav PiKxpeXeq.^'' For the rest—as one could expect from
handbooks of rhetoric for the instruction of beginners—TtpoyuM-vdoiiaTa
—
much of their discussion is devoted to such exercises as turning a xpe^a
from one grammatical case to another; and their standard division of xpeicci
is into XoyiKaC, jipaKxiKai, (iiKiaC—a "literary," rather than a
"philological" classification. Fortunately, we have an earlier and very
" Hermogenes, Progymn. ch. 3; Aphlhonius, Progymn. ch. 3, pp. 23-25 Rabe; Theon,
Progymn. chs. 5-6, Spcngel, Rhet. Graeci 2, pp. 96-106; Nic. Soph., Progymn, ch. 3, Spengel
3, pp. 458-63. Modem literature: G. von Wartensleben, Begriffder griechischen Chreia und
Beilrdge zur Geschichle ihrerForm (Heidelberg 1901) (with a collection of philosophers' xpnai
on pp. 31-124—which does not include our anecdote in the Zeno section, pp. 128-30); Gustav
Adolf Gerhard, Phoinix von Kolophon, Texte und Untersuchungen (Leipzig und Berlin 1909)
247-53; 269 ff.; Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der lUerarischen Rhetoric (>lunchen 1960) vol. I,
536-40. Gerhard supplies numerous references to modem Uterature. Lausberg cites a wide range
of ancient sources, both Greek and Latin. For more recent literature, see also Klaus Berger,
"Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament," ANRW H. 25. 2, 1031-1432, with an
extensive bibliography, pp. 1379-1432. (The section relevant to our discussion: pp. 1092-
1110, and bibl. 1092); Robert C. Tannenhill, "Types and Functions of Apophthegms in the
Synoptic Gospels," ANRW H, 25. 2, pp. 1792-1829 (bibl. pp. 1826-29). Berger has a
"taxonomy" of xpEiai in Greek pagan and Jewish sources and the NT, according to "Frage und
Aniass der Chrien" and "Struktur der Antwort" (pp. 1096-1 103), which comes close to that of
Quintilian, and many of his examples are helpful. On p. 1095, he also refers to literature on
Xpeiai in Rabbinic sources. Tannenhill's division of xpEioci according to their purpose
("correction stories," "quest stories," "objection stories," and the like) has more to do with
modem literary theory than with ancient technique and practice. I owe the last two references to
Professor Frederick E. Brenk.
'^This common source is most likely to be later than Quintilian (see below), whose whole
treatment is hardly aware of it. The great reputation of Hermogenes in late antiquity suggests
that he may be the source.
"Nic. Soph. (n. 11 above) 459.
'* Theon (n. 1 1 above) 96. See also his discussion of the "jocular" type of xp£i«. PP- 99-
101.
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different discussion of xpeta, clearly independent of these later manuals,
which divides xpeiai into more "philological" groups: Quintilian I. 9. 4:
Chriarum plura genera traduntur: unum simile sententiae, quod est
positum in uoce simplici: "dixit ille" aut "dicere solebat"; alterum quod est
in respondendo: "interrogatus ille," uel "cum hoc ei dictum esset,
respondit"; tertium huic non dissimile: "cum quis dixisset aliquid" uel
"fecisset."
Quintilian goes on to mention also what the later rhetoricians called
jtpaKxiKTi xpeia: etiam in ipsorum faclis esse chrian putant . . . This
should not detain us. For our purpose, the important type of XP^^^ is
Quintilian's second category, in which someone was asked (epcoTn0ei(;) or
was told something by someone else (7tp6<; tov einovta), and he responded
(EiTtev, ecpT], (prioiv and the like). We shall soon return to this type of chria
in respondendo and cast an eye on the numerous examples of it in Diogenes
Laertius and some pseudo-Plutarchean collections of apophthegmata. Let us
first consider the nature and development of xpeia as a literary form.
The derivation of xpeia from the Homeric and Hesiodic aivoq and the
Aesopian fables, maintained by some modern scholars,'' seems to me
unlikely. A fable employing animals as symbols of human character and
behaviour and a story about a clever repartee by some great man—albeit that
the purpose of both is "to point a moral and adorn a tale"—are two different
things. XpEva starts not immediately after the age of epic poetry but a few
hundred years later, and in a philosophical milieu. The books of xpeiai
ascribed to Diogenes of Sinope by Diogenes Laertius, quoting Sotion (DL
VL 80) are given in a "dissenting list": it is not in the main list of his
works, probably derived from the Alexandrian catalogues, which precedes it.
Von Wartenslebcn may be right in regarding Metrocles the Cynic (DL VL
33) as the first compiler of a book of xpeiai known to us by title.'^ With
Zeno of Citium we seem to be on surer ground. Diogenes Laertius quotes
one anecdote about Crates the Cynic, Zeno's own teacher, on the authority
of Zt|vcov 6 KiTieuq ev xaTi; xpEiaii; (VI. 91). Aristo of Chius is reported
by Diogenes (VII. 163) to be the author of xpei«»v id; and Persaeus (VII.
36) as the author of xpe^wv 5'. It is far from certain that the xpEicc npbq
Aiovuaov ascribed by Diogenes (II. 84) to Aristippus of Cyrene is a
collection of apophthegms: why the singular? The other work, XpEiSv
tpia, is ascribed to him in Sotion's alternative hst (II. 85). It thus appears
that the practice of gathering such anecdotes and publishing them arose first
in the circles of the Cynics and the early Stoics. By the time we reach the
first century BCE, we have five anecdotes ascribed expressly to the Xpeiai of
Hecato, the pupil of Panaetius (DL VI. 4; 32; 95; VII. 26; 172), and two
'^ Von Wartenslebcn (n. 1 1 above) 8-27; Geriiard (ib.) 247-53.
'6 Von Wartenslebcn 29.
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anecdotes likely to have been lifted from the same collection (VII. 2; 181).^''
One can assume that in the three or four centuries which separate Diogenes
Laertius from Hecato, such collections of xpeiai must have increased and
multiplied as philosophy was leaving its private enclaves and becoming part
of a gentleman's education. The pseudo-Plutarchean collections of
apophthegms belong to this literary form and most probably to this period.
So does much of the material which went into the making of Gnomolo^ium
Vaticanum and other gnomologia.'*
When we come to Diogenes Laertius, we note, not merely that he
recounts innumerable xpeiai of various types—virtually hundreds of them.
We would rather have been surprised if he did not. What is more significant
is that most of his xpeiai tend to come in series, or in clusters, in one or
two places in each life. Since I have not seen this phenomenon noted
before, '' I supply here a provisional list of these clusters of xpeiai in
Diogenes Laertius:
Book I Thales: 35-36; Solon: 58-59; 60; 63; Chilon: 68-
69;77; Bias: 86-87; Cleobulus: 91-92; Periander: 97-98;
Anacharsis: 103-05; Myson: 107-08; Pherecydes: 117.
Bookn Anaxagoras: 7; 10; Socrates: 30-36; Aristippus: 66-
82; StUbo: 114-18; 119; 127-28.
Bookm Plato: 1-5.
BooklV Xenocrates: 10; Arcesilaus: 43; Bion: 47 (with the
significant introduction: nA-Eioxd xe
KaxaXiXoimv {)jio|ivTi(iaTa, aA.Xa Kal
d7to(p9eY|J.aTa xpeicbSii TtpayixaxEiav
TiepiEXOvxa.)^; 48-51.
" See Heinz GomoU, Der stoische Philosoph llekaton (Leipzig 1933) 90-91 ; 1 12-13.
'* As suggested already by Gerhard (n. 1 1 above) 252-53.
1' Richard Hope, The Book of Diogenes Laertius (New York 1930), deals mainly with
Diogenes' probable sources for anecdotes in the various Lives (pp. 71, 82-83), and with a literary
"taxonomy" of anecdotes according to their purpose and function (pp. 169-74). Eduard
Schwartz, article Diogenes Laertius (Diogenes 40), REV (= Realencydopddie, vol. v) (1905)
738-63, finds it sufficient to say: "Dass Diogenes Apophthegmensammlungen vorlagen, sah
schon Bahnsch; diese Untersuchungen lassen sich nur auf Grand handschrifUichen Materials
weiterfuhren" (758). But why? Bahnsch has not been available to me. I find no reference to
Xpetai in our latest book on this theme of the sources, J0rgen Mejer, Diogenes Laertius and his
Hellenistic Background, Hermes Einzelschriften 40 (Wiesbaden 1978)—where one might have
expected something in the section "Biographies of Philosophers," 90-93.
^Confirming, in similar words, the etymology offered by Theon (n. 11 above) 97: oti
HaXXov x<ov oXKoiM xpeia)5r|i; ecrtl tw pio). Von Wartensleben (n. 1 1 above) 28-29, argues
for this etymology, against the fantastic derivation from xP1<J(i6(; suggested by Wilhelm
GoetUing, but he does not refer to this passage of Diogenes. The derivation of XpEia from
Xpei<o5r|(;—although not much else about its nature and history—was already taken for granted
by Isaac Casaubon, Animadversiones in Athenaeum (Lugduni 1645) ("the last edition revised by
the author!") 4, line 22 ff.
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BookV Aristoteles: 17-19; Demetrius: 81.
Book VI Antisthenes: 3-9; Diogenes: 22-28; 30; 33-69; 80; 91.
BookVn Zeno Citieus: 16; 19-26; Aristo Chius: 163; Cleanthes:
171-74; Chrysippus: 182-84.
BookVm Pythagoras: 9; Theano: 43.
Book DC Zeno Eleaticus: 27; Pyrrho: 64; 66; 113.
Whether Diogenes compiled these large clusters of anecdotes from
various collections available to him, or copied them from one or two
gnomologia which already existed in his time, is a moot question. We
simply do not know about the structure of these early collections of xpeiai.
Some of the later gnomologia which have reached us are arranged in a
"doxographical" manner, by themes; some are arranged by philosophers.^'
The existence of clusters of xpeiai in Diogenes, and his general manner of
work, would suggest that such a collection of xpeiav arranged under the
names of individual philosophers (Hecato's?) was employed. What is of far
greater interest to us is the very large number of xpeiai in Diogenes and
other sources which employ the formulae cpcmriGeii; or 7tp6<; tov eiitovTa
in their "protasis," and etpri, einev (or the like) in their "apodosis":
Quintilian's chria in respondendo. Again, I have not seen this issue of the
formulaic structure of xpeiai treated anywhere in this particular fashion. I
therefore supply here another provisional list of three types of xpeicti: the
plain dixit or dicere solebat, Quintihan's first category; interrogatus ilk, his
category II. 1; and cum hoc ei dictum esset, his II. 2. I have taken my
examples, for what is, after all, a provisional list, from Diogenes Laertius,
and from the pseudo-Plutarchean 'Ano(p9eY|ia-:a PaoiXecov Kal
otpaxTiYcbv (BI) and 'Ano(fQiy\iaia AaKcoviKcx (AA).
I. dixit; dicere solebat (ecpTi, eXeye, ecpaoKe and the like).
DL I. 35; 58; 63; 69; 77; 86; 87; 91; 103; 104; 105; 108;
II. 30; 31; 32; 33; 34; 36; 67; IV. 48; 49; 50; 51; V.
18; 19; VI. 3; 5; 6; 8; 27; 28; 30; 33; 35; 38; 46; 49;
51; VII. 21; 22; 23; IX. 64.
n. interrogatus ilk . . . respondit (epcotTiGei; and the like . . . e<pTi and
the like).
^' Some, like the famous Gnomologium Vaticanum, are arranged by "doxographical"
headings. Since doxography started with Theophrastus, it is not impossible that even some of
the earliest books of xpeiai may have been arranged in this manner. But it appears that this
literary form began in Cynic and Stoic circles. Disciples of the early Cynics and Stoics were at
least very likely to arrange their collections by names of philosophers, to glorify their own
masters. For a recent discussion of gnomologia, with copious references to manuscript material
and modem research, see Dimitri Gutas, Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation, A
Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia, American Oriental Society (New Haven, Conn. 1975)
9-35.
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DL I. 35; 36; 58; 59; 68; 77; 86; 87; 103; 104; 105; H. 10; 33;
68; 69; 70; 72; 73; 76; 80; m. 38; IV. 48; V, 17; 18; 19; VI.
4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 27; 47; 49; 50; 51; 52; 54; 55; 56; 60; 62; 63;
67; 68; 69; Vn. 23; 24; 26; 172; Vm. 43; IX 113.
BZ 176D; 184C; 185A; 190D; 194A.
AA 210E; F; 212C; 213C; 215D; 216C; 217D; 218F; 220A; F;
222E; 224D; 225D; 227B; C-D; 231F; 232B.
in. cum hoc ei dictum esset . . . respondit (jcpoq xov eijtovxa . . . ecpti
and the like).
DL I. 35; 36; 63; H. 7; 10; 35; 36; 71; 74; 75; 76; 79; 80; 81;
1 19; 128; IV. 49; 50; V. 19; VI. 4; 8; 9; 33; 34; 36; 39; 42;
45; 49; 52; 54; 55; 59; 60; 61; 64; 68; VH. 19; 20; 21; 23;
171; 172; 174; Vm. 182; K. 113.
BI 175C; D; E; 176D; 182C; 186E-F; 189E; F; 190D.
AA 208B; 217D; E; 218C; F; 221D-E; 224D; 228A; D; 229E.
A note of warning. I have not included here Quintilian's third category,
cum quis dixisset aliquid uelfecisset. The number of xpeiai of this type is
roughly the same as their number in the other categories—with a slight
preponderance of it in the Cynic Lives of Diogenes, as one could only
expect. Nor—since this is merely a provisional list—have I given the
numbers of xpeiai of each type in each paragraph of Diogenes or Stephanas
page of Plutarch. Many xpeiai of the same category tend to come in twos
or threes in the same region of the text, just as groups of xpeiai of the
same category tend to cluster together within a wider area. It may well be
that Quintilian's classification represents divisions and chapter-headings
already existent in collections available to him—and to Diogenes later.
This should be further investigated. For my present purpose, suffice it if I
have shown that xpeiai beginning with the formulae epto-rnSeiq and npo^
xov EiTtovxa are as frequent in some of our major sources as are plain
maxims or sayings.
I shall not weary the reader with specimens of xpeiai beginning with
Ttpoq Tov eiTiovxa. Almost any of the dozens in my list will do. But our
particular xpeia in Plutarch has two unusual characteristics: a) instead of
the usual beginning of the "apodosis" with ecpri, einev or the like, Plutarch
has here a.\xiXzytv, b) the "protasis" is no mere saying or question by
someone, but a literary quotation.
It is true that avteAjEYev is unusual. I have found no other example of
it in xpeiai I have checked.^^ This may be due to Plutarch's literary art,
^The same anecdote is reported with the same words in some MSS of the scholia on Lucian
Cal. 8 in Jacobilz' edilio maior, vol. TV (Leipzig 1841) 232-33, beginning with the words
TlXodtapxoc, ev xm itepi Lxcoikcov evavxicondxcov. It is therefore of no independent value. I
cannot see why v. Amim should cite this scholion at the end of SVF I. 78, as if it were a
different source.
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wishing to emphasize that, despite the matter of his argument, Zeno did
listen to the other side and refuted it. Or he may have wished to emphasize
that Zeno's refutation was couched in the "antilogistic," disjunctive form.
We shall return to this.
As to xpeiai with literary quotations, they are not all that rare. Here is
a partial list of some such xpeiai in Diogenes Laertius: II. 78; 82; 117;
IV. 9; 46; 47; VI. 36; 44; 50; 52; 53; 55; 57; 63; 66; 67; 104; VII. 172;
IX. 59.
Of all these, perhaps the nearest in form to Plutarch's story of Zeno is
Diogenes Laertius' anecdote concerning Diogenes of Sinope and his master
Xeniades (VI. 36):
Tm Jtpianevtp aiizbv EevidSri (ptioi, "aye onac, to Ttpoo-
xaxTOnevov jiovnoEii;." xoii 5' eiTtovToi;
avco ncnajimv xcopovoi itayai,
"ei 5e iaxpov ejtpito voomv, ovk av," (ecpn)^^ "avxS etceiGo-o,
dX,X.' tlntc, av oji; avco noxantbv xtopovoi Jtayai;"
Plutarch himself was not unaware of the nature of xpei«- At least in
one passage of his writings, his view of its value is far from
complimentary. In Chapter 7 ofProgr. Virt., Plutarch speaks of those who
begin to apply themselves to the study of arguments (Xoyoi)—and begin,
usually, by choosing one of the wrong types of arguments. Those who
begin by collecting anecdotes are the last on this list (78F):
. . . evioi 5e XPeio"; "^c'l Icxopiaq dvaXEyo^Evoi jtEpuaoiv, uojtep
'AvdxapOK; E^eyE xm vonionaxi Jtpoq ov5ev ti to dpi9nEw
XpconEvoix; opav zo\>q "EXXr\y/ac„ ovxcoq xoiq A.6yoi<;
Jtapapi0|iovn£voi Kai TtapapvGnovvxei;, aXKo 5' o\)8ev eii; ovtioiv
dji' a'uxmv xi0E|iEvoi.
Not that Plutarch himself is above using some xpeiai when it suits
him. At least in one place in his Lives (Demosth. 11. 2-7), he recounts
some xpeiai of Demosthenes, ending with the words (7), dXka nepl ^ev
xo-oTwv Kal exepcov yzXoiatv Kaiitep eti nXtia Xiyeiv exovxei;,
evTavGa 7ia\)o6|X£0a. This sounds almost as though Plutarch had a
collection of xpeTai before him. He could not resist the temptation to tell
some of them; but being a serious writer of "morality biographies," he soon
checked himself and remembered his real task. He continues: xov 5' aXXov
avTov xpojiov Kal to 'f\Qoc, anb i&v npd^EOJv Kal xr\q noXixeiaq
GecopeioQai SiKaiov eoxiv.
It is clear that Plutarch knows what a xPEia is, and that he attaches no
great value to it as a source of serious information and edification either to
^ Supplied by Stephanus and obviously right, as the fonnula of the "apodosis."
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the historian or to the philosopher. Did he, then, simply slip and forget all
he knew about this sub-literary form and its value when he came to our
story about Zeno? Or did he, in his zeal to amass as many Stoic
contradictions as possible, overlook the fragile nature of this kind of source?
Since we can only guess where he may have found this particular xpeia
(Hecato, or one of the early compilations by a pupil of Zeno?), and since it
is not unlikely that when he wrote the work before us, he was already
relying on his own notes and excerpts rather than on his sources,^ we can
only guess.
This is not the end of our enquiry. Having told his anecdote, Plutarch
continues: xouxov 6e tov Xoyov epcoTTjoaq kzX. Cherniss translates:
"after having propounded his argument (1034E)." But is epcotav simply
"to propound an argument?" Nor is it simply "to pose a question," as
translated by Amyot ("& ce pendant luy mesme qui faisoit cest d^mande" .
.
.) and translators who follow him. Zeno poses no question in Plutarch's
story. It has a more technical sense, some traces of the history of which are
indicated in LSJ, s. v. epcmaco II. 2:
In Dialectic, opp. demonstration, question an opponent in order to
refute him from his answers, Arist. APr. 24" 24; xi ib. 42" 39; hence later,
submit, set forth, propound an argument, Xoyov Gal. 5. 257 :—Pass., 6
^yoq . . TipcoTTioSai (paivexai Arr. Epict. 2. 19. 1; ep(oxr|9EVTO(; xou
ao<pia|iaxo<; S.E. P. 2. 237.
Even this is to simplify matters. It is true that Sextus frequently uses
the combination Xoyov epcoxav (epcoxav and variants). But he always
uses this expression for a refutation, usually in the form of a syllogism, of
a "dogmatic" position. The refuting 'koyoc, offered by Sextus is more often
than not a plain syllogism, but sometimes it is a disjunctive argument in
the form of "either . . . or", concluding with "neither . . . nor" at the point
of final refutation. Here is a provisional list:
Plain syllogistic refutation: Pll I. 20; 33-34; H. 134; 239; 248; 250; 254
(where it is distinguished from o6<piona); HI. 66; 116; 280; M VHI.
215; 216; 227; 234; 444-^5; DC. 92; 133; 182; 205; X. 171.
Disjunctive refutation: PH H. 185 (+ M Vm. 465); 186; HI. 76; 127;
163; 239 (referring back to 172); M X. 94; 110.
What is, perhaps of greater interest is that in most of these places,
Sextus applies this expression, epcoxav Xoyov and variants, to the
Pyrrhonian's own refutation of his "dogmatic" opponent Diodorus Cronus
is mentioned more than twenty times by name in Sextus' works. Only at
^ See Chemiss (n. 6 above) 369^401, who argues for the use of "note-books" containing
excerpts made by Plutarch himself, as his main immediate source for passages quoted in his
Stoic boolcs.
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X. 87, 94 and 110 does Sextus apply this expression to a disjunctive
argument by Diodorus—in all three cases, to the same argument against the
existence of motion. Yet it is precisely to Diodorus Cronus and his
Megaric friends that we must turn if we are to trace the origin of this
peculiar expression— which, by the time of Sextus, has been watered down
to imply any "structured" argument used in refuting an opponent.
Of Euclides of Megara, we are told by Diogenes Laertius (II. 106):
. . . Kal oi dtjt' ouTov MeyapiKol TtpooTiYope-uov-co, eix'
epiaxiKoi, ijoxepov 5e diaXeKxiKoi, ovq ovtoaq covonaoe Ttpwxo^
Aioviiaioi; 6 XaXioidovioi; 5ia x6 Jtpoq epcoxTioiv Kal dnoKpioiv
xovi; Xoyo-oi; 5iaxi0ea9ai.^'
Of Eubulides of Miletos, Diogenes writes:
. . . oq Kal noX.A.o'uq ev 5iaA,eKxiKti Xoyowi; ripcoxTiaE, xov
xe \|;E\)56nevov kzX. (H. 108; Giannantoni IIB'. 13, p. 53; Muller 64, p.
31).
Muller translates properly: "arguments de forme interrogative." This is
confirmed by an anonymous comic fragment—most probably by a
contemporary of Eubulides—cited by Diogenes in the same passage:
ovpioxiKoq 5" E\>Po\)Xi5tii; Kepaxiva^ epcoxuv
Kal vE'uSaAxx^ooiv XoyoK; xovq prixopaq KvA-itov kxX,.
This is not the place to discuss in any detail the seven paradoxes of
Eubulides counted in this passage of Diogenes.^ But it should be fairly
clear by now that some, at least, of these arguments were counched in the
form of disjunctive questions, the answer to any of which is "yes" or "no."
A good example
—
probably the nearest we have to the original form—of
this Megaric practice, is supplied by Diogenes Laertius (II. 116), in the
form of a xpeia about Stilbo of Megara:
xovxov (paoiv Ktpi xf\<; 'ABriva^ zt\<; xot> OeiSiov xoiouxov
xiva Xoyov epcoxfiaai- "apd ye r[ zo\y Aioq 'AGtivo Geoi; eaxi;"
<pr|aavxo(; 5e, "vai," "avxT| 5e ye," elnev, "ovk eoxi Aioi;, aXXd
$Ei5io\)-" ovyxtopoviXEvoD Se, "oil)K apa," eTtie, "Qzoq ecxiv."
One notes the expression Xoyov epcoTTjoaq. A similar expression,
avvepcoxa Xoyov, is employed by Sextus in reporting the disjunctive
^ I cannot see why Gabriele Giannantoni, Socraticorum Reliquiae vol. I (Naples 1983) 129,
quotes the last part of this sentence only in HP 3 (Dionysius Chalcedonius). Robert Muller, Les
Migariques, Fragments el limoignages (Paris 1985) 25, quotes the whole passage as 31, the
first fragment in Section IC, "Developpement et situation dans lliistoire de la philosophic de
I'ecole issue dTiuclide."
For the latest detailed discussion, with the relevant sources (alas, in translation only!), see
MuUer Oast n.). Annexe I. 75-90, and his notes to Frs. 64-65, pp. 113-19; 193 (n. 128)-196
(n. 168).
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argument of Diodorus Cronus against movement {M X. 87; repeated with
TiponfioSai (paoiv ibv Xoyov at 94, and TjpcoTriKe 5e 6 AioScopoq xov . . .
^.oyovat 110).
If Diodorus was the inventor of so many Fangschlilsse, he was,
according to Diogenes Laertius, still no match for Stilbo of Megara. The
story of how Diodorus died of shame because he could not solve dialectical
problems put to him by Stilbo is well-known today: it has been spread
around by logicians who, even if they would not go as far themselves, look
with envy on the serious manner in which those ancient Megarians took
their logic. Fact or fiction—this should not detain us here.^ What is of
greater importance is the language (DL II. 1 1 1):
ovxo; jtapa IlxoXenoiq)^ x^ IcoTfjpi 5iaxpiPcov Xoyo-oi; xivai;
SiaXcKxiKovi; tipcoxt|6ti Jtpoq ZxiXTtcovoq- Kal nil Swdnevo?
Jtapaxpnua 5iaX.ii)oao6ai kxX,.^'
We have already seen one epcoTTjOK; of Stilbo. Diogenes Laertius II.
119 supplies us with two more of this sort. These epcoxtioeic; are so
similar in nature to the long string of Fangschlilsse reported by Diogenes at
VII. 186-87, that I am inclined to think they may well be also Stilbonian
in origin. Diogenes reports them with the opening sentence 6 5ti (piA.6oo<po(;
Ktti xoiotiToax; tivaq Tipcbta Xoyouq, and ends with the words oi 5'
E-uPo-u^{5o-o TOTJ-to (paoiv. Since, in the first part of 186, we have been
given the names of some o^cbvoiioi—two doctors and one writer on
agriculture also named Chrysippus—it looks, at first glance, as if what we
have here is something like "but to return to Chrysippus the philosopher
. .
.." It is therefore taken to be a Chrysippean testimonium by modern
scholars.^" But these could hardly be Chrysippus' own arguments. After
all, Chrysippus objected to the MeyapiKcc epcoTTiixaTa (SVF II. 270-71);
and the only argument in this passage which has a Sitz im Leben of a sort
is "the Man in Megara" paradox. Add to this the fact that the last of these
arguments is ascribed to another Megarian, Eubulides. Quite clearly, 6
(piXoooepoq at the beginning of this passage is a "bad stitch," probably by
"See Muller 128, on Frs. 99-100—who also rightly remarks: "On note, d'autre part, a
propos de la dialeclique en g6n6ral, que ces fr. offrent I'avanuge de contcnir explicitement
plusieurs des traits characteristiques £voqu6s ailleurs: les arguments en forme de question,
I'obligation de repondre sur le champ, et aussi le charactere de jeu de soci6t6 que r6vetait
volonliers un entretien dialeclique." (My emphasis).
^ Misprinted ITpoXenaicp in Long's OCT.
^ Pliny the Elder, NH VII. 1 80, translates the report he must have found in a similar Greek
source: . . . pudore [obiit] Diodorus sapientiae dialecticae professor, lusoria quaestione non
prolinus ab interrogatione Stitponis dissoluta. A reader of this Latin testimonium alone would
have to guess hard in order to arrive at the terminology of its Greek Unlerlage. Both Greek and
Latin passages: Giatmantoni n F 1-2, vol. I, pp. 73-75.
^ Von Amim, SVF U. 279, p. 92, with the "man in Megara" argument—of all things—in
spaced letters signifying genuine Chrysippus. Giannantoni HI B 13, p. 53, referring to this SVF
fragment in evidence of Chrysippean origin. Muller 65, p. 31.
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Diogenes himself, who may have found this passage among his notes for
his Chrysippus book, without indication of the source. Why not? // est
capable de tout. If there is any truth in Heraclides' report (DL II. 120;
Giannantoni II 4; Muller 167) that Stilbo was also a pupil of Zeno of
Citium, one possible explanation is that a string of epcmfioeK; formulated
by Stilbo, and perhaps "solved" by Chrysippus, found its way into some
late doxographic source concerned with Chrysippus. It may have been
truncated in that source—or it may be Diogenes who copied only the "juicy"
paradoxes. But enough of this.
That the Megarians were not only, or chiefly, logicians, but first and
foremost dialecticians—this has been noted (although not as often as it
should have been) by some historians of logic, and by the latest editor of the
Megaric testimonia. They also note that these Megaric epcoTTioeii; were
originally couched in the form of alternative questions to be answered with
"yes" or "no."^^ But almost all the Megaric epanrioeK; which have reached
us are already formulated in the form of a disjunctive syllogism—in fact, in
the form of a Stoic disjunctive argument, using fj or lixoi as the disjunctive
particles.^2 Why, then, call them eponriaEK;?
A clue to this problem may be found in two versions of the same
syllogism, ascribed by Diogenes Laertius to Diogenes of Sinope. In both
versions, the argument is almost word for word the same—^but the opening
formula is distinctly different. Let us have the two:
VI. 37 VI. 72
ovveA^i^exo 5e koI ovzcoc,- jtavTa xav oo<p(ov eivai Xiycov koI
xoiowxovi; Xoyovi; epcoxSv oiovq
ovo) 7tpoEipr|KanEV
xwv Gecbv eoxi Ttotvxa- Tidvxa xwv 0ewv eoxi-
<p(Xoi 8e ol aocpoi xoiq Geoii;- piXoi 8£ xoiq oocpoii; ol Geoi-
Koivd 5e xd xmv (piXcov Koivd 5e xd xwv (piXcov
itdvxa dpa eoxi xwv oo<pMv jtdvxa ctpo xwv oo<pwv
The variations in wording are insignificantly small. But when, at 37,
Diogenes Laertius presents this argument as a plain syllogism
(ouvEXoyi^exo), he says plainly ovzcoc,. When, at 72, he presents it as an
epcbxTioK;, he uses a more careful language: xoiouxovq X-oyovg epcoxSv
oiou(;—indicating that this is not the exact form of Diogenes' original
^' Carl PranU, Geschichle der Logik im Abendlande. Bd I (Leipzig 1 855) 42 ("cponav ist der
slehende Ausdruck"), Uking such passages as Isocrates 15. 45, aXXoi 8£ xive^ nepi xct?
£p(BTT|aei(; sal xcti; dnoKpiaeic; ye^maaw, ou(; avxiXoyiKOxx; KaX^uoiv, Arist. Soph. El.
17. 175b ff.; 176al4 ff; Top. Vn. 7. 160a32; Alex, ad Soph. El. 50 ff, to refer to the Megarics.
One could add to this Polemo's warning against some dialecticians of his age, including the
words Kotxa (lev ttiv epamioiv 6a\)nd5ea6ai, DL IV. 18. Michael Frede, Die sloische
Loeik (Gottingen 1974) 19-23, esp. 20-21. Muller. loc. ciL n. 27 above, and 1 13.
^^ Frede Oast n.) 93-96.
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epcbrnoK;. I do not accuse Diogenes Laertius of such fine distinctions. He
must have found them in his sources. Such language is not restricted to
this particular passage. Stilbo's epcotTjOK; at II. 116—although it opens
with a proper question (but carries on with two plain oD^Jiepdo^axa) is
also prefaced with xoioutov tiva A-oyov epcoxfiCTai. So is the string of
EpcoTTjoeii; at VII. 186-87, just discussed. It opens with xovo-oxouq xwac,
Tipcoxa Xoyovic,—and indeed, these are already couched in plain disjunctive
form.
These are only a few traces of such a distinction. By the time of Sextus
Empiricus, epcoxav had already lost its original sense and was merely used
for any refutation—disjunctive or plainly syllogistic. A formula like
eponaxai 8e Kal ouxcoq (e.g. M VII. 340) or ouTwq ovvEpcbta (X. 87)
is quite regular. At X. 110, Sextus can even say of Diodorus Cronus
Tipa>Tr|Ke 6e 6 AioScopoq xov cKKeinevov ^oyov—referring back to the
argument of 87 (xov TiEpicpoptitiKov auvepona Xoyov . . . Xeycov
—
followed by a plain disjunctive argument) and 94 (o-cav Xeyri 6 Av68copo<;
—
followed by the same disjunction). But could one assume that the more
careful formulation, using xoioti-co(; and variants in the passages cited in our
last paragraphs (and one can add, e.g., DL VI. 69), is an indication of an
earlier practice, at a stage when reports of Megaric EpcoTr|aei(; were ab-eady
being "translated" into the forms of Stoic syllogisms, but when the
"translators"—to indicate that this was a reformulated version of the original
dialectic argument, used a cautionary xoiovxo^ rather than a plain ovxoq? It
is, in any case, not without interest that in our passage of Stoic. Rep.,
Plutarch opens his story with the cautious xoiouxra xivi Xoyco xpw^Evoq,
although he follows it at the end with xovxov 5e xov Xoyov ipan-qaac,. Is
it possible that what he found in his source was xoiovxoi; in both cases
and that Zeno had couched his refutation, in the original setting, in the form
of Megaric EpcbxTiou;?^^
How exacdy did Zeno do that? In our passage of Plutarch, he asks no
questions: he already uses die "translation" into a disjunctive argument.
Almost all the epcoxfiaei(; ascribed to the Megarics and Diogenes of Sinope
have also reached us in such "translations." The only exception I know is
the opening question of Stilbo's argument at DL II. 1 16, beginning as it
does with apd yE.
Yet we have a number of such EpcoxTioEii;, beginning with apa or apd
yE, ascribed by Aristotle (Soph. El. 20. 177bl0-26) to Euthydemus. The
immediate context (177a33 ff.) is that of Xoyoi jiapd xV 6ia£pEaiv Kal
ouvSeoiv. But the wider context (175al^ ff.) is that of aTtoKpioEiq to
^' That Plutarch is not invariably careless may, perhaps, emerge from a comparison of Stoic.
Rep. 16. 1041C-D, •coio-oxouq rifxiniKe XoyoD^ (where the original arguments may have
been disjunctive and put in the form of questions—tut where, in any case, Plutarch may simply
have changed and shortened the various stages of the original syllogisms), with 10. 1036A,
where the quotation from Chrysippus is followed by tocuti yap aiixai? Xe^eaiv eipntEV.
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Sophistic ip(oxT\iiaza.^ Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described in
Plato's Euthydemus (e.g. 272b) as experts in the epioxiicn xexv-q. Their
mode of investigation and refutation is clearly that of posing a question of
"either . . . or" (e.g. 275d: Jtotepoi eioi tSv dvGpconcov o'l ^avGdvovtei;,
01 oocpol fi 01 (ina9Ei<;;) to which the other side can only answer with one of
two alternatives. The refutation (in this example, 276a-b) is conducted in
terms of questions, some of which naturally begin with apa. These
questions are so often called epcottioek; or epcoTrmaxa in that dialogue,
that one need not bring any reference. That Socrates himself also poses
epanrniaxa (e.g. 278e), and some of his own questions begin with apd
ye (ibid.), is only part of the whole purport of this dialogue, pointing out
the difference between Socrates' questions and refutations, which lead to
some positive advancement, and those of the eristics, aimed merely at an
easy refutation. The main point is that, at the hands of such Sophists as
Euthydemus and his brother, this technique of refutation by a series of
questions with alternative answers is clearly described as eristic—the very
name given to the Megarians in DL II. 106. We can draw some support for
these antecedents of the Megaric eristic in that famous passage of Meno
(80d-e), where Meno poses to Socrates two questions, each of which can be
described as potentially disjunctive. Socrates, identifying Meno's argument
as epioTiKoq X6yo<; (80e2), proceeds to "translate" them into a proper
disjunctive argument. Euthydemus' arguments, all beginning with apa
questions, as reported by Aristotle in Soph. El. 20, are very similar in type
to the Megarian kpiovqaEic, we have discussed. Whatever the part played by
the Eleatics, and especially by Zeno of Elea, in the formation of the
dialectic, both of Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and their like and of the
School of Megara—and this is not the place to enter into this old
problem—it is clear that one can draw a fairly straight line from the
question-and-answer technique of refutation of the two brothers to the
technique of Megaric eparcriOK;.^^
The technique of "translating" Megaric epcoxTjaEK; into Stoic
syllogisms—first, with a cautious toiovto(; and variants—may well have
been instituted by the Stoics themselves, in order to facilitate logical
refutation. What is clear is that the Stoics studied such Fangschlusse and
^ In Rhel. U. 24. 1400a28 ff., Aristotle reproduces the "trireme in Piraeus" Epc6xT)ai?, as
well as some other EpayrnaEii; of Euthydemus, in shorthand syllogistic form. But then, in his
Rhetoric, he is not concerned with the questioning technique of the dialectician, but rather with
depicting the same fallacy, to 8ii;ipTmEvov cwxiGevxa Xiyciv f\ x6 ovyKEiHEvov
8iaipo«vta {1401a25-26) as employed by the orator in "straight" speeches.
'^Muller, 113, on 64-65, notes that no argument ascribed to Eubulides in our sources
appears in Plato's Euthydemus, while two of his paradoxes are presented in Aristotle's De
Sophisticis Elenchis. This would strengthen the assumption that Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus—some of whose arguments, as we have just noted, arc reported by Aristotle
independently of Plato—were indeed "eristics" in their own right. One can, therefore, also
assume that their techniques may well have influenced the Megarians.
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employed the whole armoury of their own dialectic to refute them. The zeal
of Chrysippus and his disciples in refuting such MeyapiKot EpcoTT||xata or
oocpiojiata is richly attested in SVF II. 270-87, assembled by von Amim
from such diverse sources as Cicero, Plutarch, Galen, Lucian, Diogenes
Laertius, Sextus, Epictetus and some of the commentators on Aristotle.
But we remember that even in our chapter of Plutarch ( = SVF I. 50), we are
told of Zeno: tXvt 5e oocpionaxa Kal tt|v 5iaA,eKTiKTiv aq xovzo
Ttoieiv 5vva|iEVTiv ekeXe-oe ktX. From SVF II. 271 (Plutarch), and
especially from 272 (Galen), it seems clear that such oocpionaxa are mainly
those Megaric paradoxes. It is not unlikely that such Megaric paradoxes
were the main preoccupation of Chrysippus' TtEpi tcov oo(pio|ia-c(ov npbq
'HpaK^EiSTiv Kal UoXXw (DL VII. 198 = SVF II. 16). Yet we have seen
that in our chapter of Plutarch, Zeno is made to employ precisely this type
of Megaric oocpio^a to refute his unfortunate opponent. Plutarch had noted
as much as that, and accused Zeno of contradiction. Should we?
Of course not The anecdote as we have it is no piece of philosophical
doctrine, taken out of one of Zeno's serious books, but an amusing xpeia.
in which Zeno is reported by someone else as refuting an adversary who
thinks he is "too clever by half," and he does this by using precisely that
sort of Megaric dialectic which he spent much of his time refuting.
Moreover, by listening to the other man's argument and spending some time
in answering it with a counter-argument (Plutarch's emphatic
ocvteXeyev),^^ Zeno shows in practice that he has, in this case, listened to
the other side.
If our xpEia is a genuine anecdote, recounting something which really
happened to Zeno—and we must remember that Plutarch is our only
source—^^onc can now use one's imagination and reconstruct roughly what
may have happened.
Zeno was most probably expounding in public some of his own ideas
and referring with contempt to those of someone else, which he described as
"not worth listening to." Someone in the audience challenged him by
quoting the hexametre line, to the effect that one should listen to the other
side. Zeno—far from not listening to the other side—even bothered to
refute him. In his refutation, he used
—
quite consciously, I would guess
—
the Megaric mode of refutation which, as a teacher of dialectic, he did his
best to confute. Those of his proper pupils standing around must have
realized—and most probably enjoyed—^both the fallacious nature of Zeno's
argument, and the "refutation in practice" offered by his very action. But
^If Prantl (n. 31 above) is right in regarding Isocrates 15. 45 as a reference to the Megaric
technique—and the similarity in terminology to passages we have examined, where the
Megarians are explicitly mentioned, is compelling—ihen the term avxeXcyev in our passage of
Plutarch echoes avTiXoyiKoi of Isocrates, thus confirming our suggestion that in the original
form of this anecdote, Zeno was depicted as using a Megaric Epamiai<; technique.
" See note 22 above.
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here was a clever piece of repartee. It would be a pity not to record it.
Someone did. It found its way into some collection of xpeioii. where
—
when he was collecting materials for his books against the Stoics—Plutarch
found it. By the time he came to write Stoic. Rep., Plutarch most probably
had forgotten his source. He either paid no attention to the obvious form of
this xpeia. or forgot (what Theon, at least, knew) that a xpeia can
sometimes be a mere joke. In his zeal to refute Zeno, he treated this clever
little joke as a serious piece of Zenonian doctrine. Unfortunately, he has
been followed in this by modem scholarship.
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